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INTRODUCTION 
Meera Sabaratnam 
SOAS University of  London 
Theorising transnational governance is of  central importance to understanding how the 
world works. The proliferation of  frameworks, compacts, accords and agreements across 
multiple policy fields begs questions as to how they emerge, how power operates within and 
through them, what they foreclose and in whose interests they work. When applied to the 
legitimation of  organised violence outside the state, they seem to challenge foundational 
aspects of  global order.  
In Deborah Avant’s article “Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of  Private 
Military and Security Services"she argues that an approach grounded in relational 
pragmatism can help us best make sense of  these phenomena. This approach emphasises 
the power of  networks, the re-shaping of  actor preferences, creativity and openness and the 
significance of  process in influencing outcomes. Avant concludes that rather than seeing 
global governance in terms of  ‘wins’ and ‘losses’, emphasising its productive and creative 
character is a better way of  understanding its potential. 
In our symposium, four scholars welcome Avant’s piece and engage with the argument with 
contributions that are longer than usual, which reflects the richness of  the questions raised 
by its arguments. Heikki Patomäkiagrees that the relational ontology is an improvement on 
present debates, but notes that it does not extend to looking at the structures and context in 
which processes take place. Looking at the multiple sites of  private security 
governance, Anna Leander asks whether the problem is located where Avant says it is, and 
whether network theory is mobilised to its full potential. In evaluating the pragmatist 
approach,  Kavi Abraham  wonders about the excision of  politics, recalls Deweyan 
pragmatism as also concerned with domination, conflict and participatory democracy. In 
looking at Avant’s relationalism, Mark Laffey argues that a liberal ontology animates but also 
constrains the account of  process and the assumed public-private divide. 
Avant offers “A Pragmatic Response” to the symposium, engages with the questions and 
suggests provocatively that it is they, rather than she, who may be the real ‘optimists’ about 
global governance. 
The ISQ Blog team heartily thank Debbi and all the contributors to this symposium for 
their thought-provoking and generous engagements on such an important topic. We hope 
you enjoy the symposium: do check out our others. 
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EXPLAINING THE EMERGENCE OF 
GLOBAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Heikki Patomäki 
University of  Helsinki 
It is commonplace especially in the U.S. to divide IR theories into three: realist, liberal-
institutionalist and constructivist.  Deborah D. Avant (2016) builds on the constructivist idea 1
that the key to adequate explanation lies in the constitution of  agents and their interests. In 
her article, she makes a contribution to the study of  global governance by focusing on the 
historical process that led to the emergence of  new rules and principles of  regulating private 
security service providers. Her study is meant to show that it is the process that explains the 
outcome (new regulations) rather than just (given or constructed) actors and their interests. 
Avant relies on what she calls relational ontology, which according to her informs both 
pragmatism and network theory. It “treats social beings as emergent phenomena, 
products, at any point in time, of  interactions.” These interactions may involve a variety of  
actors from states and international organizations to civil society actors and businesses. The 
outcome of  the process depends largely on the way actors are related to each other. A 
successful outcome – understood in terms of  new governance – is more likely if  the actors 
are problem-oriented, open-minded, make connections to all those affected and pay 
attention to the workability of  the proposed solutions. Actors thus matter, but first and 
foremost through their openness to the process. 
Avant’s relational ontology is an improvement from the methodological individualism of  
both rational choice theories and many forms of  social constructivism (e.g. Searle 1996). 
Her empirical case of  regulation of  private security service providers suggests that relational 
social beings can change in the course of  the process also in unexpected ways, and that the 
outcome can only be explained by making references to this process (this is not unlike the 
explanatory model developed by Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). So far so good. 
Avant’s account of  social structures – of  the system of  relations between the positioned 
practices that agents reproduce or transform – is nonetheless rather thin. Moreover, her 
account of  the process of  creating new global governance is isolated from wider social 
processes. For instance, why did the market for military and security start to grow in the 
1990s? The 1990s was not only a decade of  peace dividend and decreasing violence, it was 
also a decade of  outsourcing, privatization and market-based solutions to perceived 
problems. States, corporations and international organizations have been increasingly relying 
 This trichotomy has replaced the earlier one where Marxism was the third pillar, although constructivism is not a theory of  1
international relations but rather a social theory (of  which there are different versions), and although in international and global 
political economy various post-Marxian perspectives are still vibrant. Since the 1990s many have aimed at a synthesis of  the first 
two perspectives (neoliberalism and neorealism), a new mixed perspective which could transcend some of  the ‘great debates’ 
and contribute to intellectual progress in the field. What has gone unnoticed to most participants in the mainstream US debates 
is that various broad IR perspectives are better seen as historical sites for a number of  theoretical and philosophical disputes 
than as coherent theories with well-specified empirical claims. See Patomäki & Wight (2000) and Patomäki (2002, ch 3).
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on private corporations for providing services they once produced themselves, also in the 
field of  security. 
Why did this free-market orientation assume such a prevalence? There are many possible 
explanations. They all refer to social structures understood as processes-in-product, as 
history frozen into currently prevailing enabling and constraining structures. Whether we 
understand the transformation that started in the 1980s (or earlier) primarily through the 
category of  regime of  accumulation (French regulation school), structural power of  capital 
(Gill & Law 1989), or discrepancy between territorial states and liberal world economy 
(Patomäki 2008), it is this wider context that has given rise to questions concerning private 
security providers. 
Of course, many possible framings of  these questions remain, including war, human rights, 
and corporate conduct. Consider framing in terms of  war. The article 47 of  the Protocol 
Additional GC 1977 (APGC77, a 1977 amendment protocol to the Geneva Conventions) 
states categorically that, “a mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a 
prisoner of  war.” It has been ratified by most states, with the exception of  United States, 
Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, Turkey and a few others. If  a private security provider assumes 
the role of  a combatant in a conflict, it clearly violates this article. Contestations over this 
point are downplayed in Avant’s article. 
Avant stresses that actors can innovate new framings, which may enable successful 
negotiations. The wider context is nonetheless decisive. The tendency to rely on private 
market-based solutions and related changes in relations of  power has transformed the 
paradigm of  regulating transnationally operating corporations. The UN Centre on 
Transnational Corporations was closed in 1993 and its activities transferred to UNCTAD's 
Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment (DTCI). In its stead, The UN 
Global Compact was launched in 2000. The latter’s approach is based on the concept of  
corporate social responsibility and relies mostly on voluntary self-regulation. Private profit-
seeking corporations are willing to participate in the Global Compact and related 
arrangements because participation bears the promise of  branding benefits. The ten 
principles of  the Global Compact concern human rights, labor, the environment and anti-
corruption. 
From this perspective, the Montreux Process looks less innovative than what Avant seems 
to be claiming. The International Code of  Conduct (ICoC) appears as a replicate of  the 
Global Compact approach applied in the context of  private security and military providers. 
From the United States perspective, the ICoC has the additional benefit of  legitimizing the 
activities of  private military companies and related state-practices, while sidelining the 
question of  illegal mercenary activities. 
My basic point is that when we are studying the selection mechanisms of  rules and 
principles such as those of  the ICoC, it is important to take into account the full set of  
wider structural conditions and processes and their impact on the outcome. 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ENGAGING THE CONTESTED AND 
MATERIAL POLITICS OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECURITY SERVICE 
GOVERNANCE FROM A PRAGMATIST 
PERSPECTIVE 
Anna Leander 
Copenhagen Business School 
Deborah Avant’s article is a welcome contribution to a topic that is surely one of  the most 
politically salient and theoretically challenging in contemporary international relations. It 
makes a range of  points I wholeheartedly agree with, it does so relying on theories I am 
interested in and I share its preoccupation with practical policy relevance. Perhaps I should 
just confirm the arguments, expanding some of  the points made? That (boring) exercise is 
fortunately unnecessary. I have many questions. Below I briefly discuss three central ones. 
1)    The Issue at Stake: Missing the Problem? 
My first question revolves around the issues at stake. Avant’s argument is resolutely positive 
and optimistic. Her core claim is that pragmatic networks have generated effective 
transnational governance of  the private military and security industry (PMSI). The 
Montreux Document (MD) she claims is now “an agreed upon framework” that has 
triggered the developments of  standards (ICoC and PSC) that governments have written 
“into legal requirements in ways that promised enforcement.”  Avant underlines that “many 
concerns remain.” But the thrust of  her article is to explore the MD success as a case of  
“effective transnational governance” created by “pragmatic networks.” While I fully share 
the view that governance of  PMSI has evolved and the MD has been an important part of  
this development, presenting the MD as having solved the problem of  PMSI governance in 
this way is problematic for many reasons. I will highlight two.  2
First, it vastly overstates the significance of  the MD and hence its capacity to solve 
“the problem” of  governance. Regulatory arrangements, in the form of  Codes of  Conduct, 
Best Practices, Benchmarks and Standards have been mushrooming. Certifications for all 
and any aspect of  the activities in the sector are also increasingly central. This makes for a 
fragmented regulatory landscape where hierarchies of  rules are unclear and contested 
(e.g.  DeWinter-Schmitt 2015;  Krahmann 2016). In the resulting regulatory competition 
about which of  these rules should count most, the MD is but one rule among many and 
not necessarily always the most central one. Second, disregarding the continuing regulatory 
competition makes it impossible to capture its role in the expansion of  the sector. 
Regulations generate new legitimate areas of  activity and roles for the industry. It also gives 
rise to a “secondary industry” of  certifiers, trainers, and experts dealing with and promoting 
the burgeoning transnational regulation. From my perspective, the regulatory competition 
 I am leaving aside a range of  issues linked to the claims Avant makes about the efficiency of  the MD and its role as a driver in 2
triggering regulatory initiatives, including government regulation.
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and the related expansion of  the sector are the main issues at stake in governance (Leander 
2010; Leander 2011; Leander 2016c). Exploring their political and legal implications, asking 
what they entail for security professionals and organizations, rights, the rule of  law, politics 
and militarism, as well as what the alternatives might be, are core tasks for research on which 
much more work is needed. 
The presentation of  the MD as an effective solution to the problem of  PMSI governance 
pre-empts these questions. Like Abraham, I have the sense that politics may be lost. My 
first question is therefore if  Avant may not be missing the problem of  transnational 
governance that she claims pragmatic networks are the solution to. 
2)    The Theories Mobilized: Obscuring the Processes? 
My second question revolves around theories. I share Avant’s interest in “relational 
pragmatism” and “network theory” (henceforth REPaNT).  Like Laffey, I also welcome 
her emphasis on the importance of  recognizing the significance of  creativity and the 
capacity of  generating something new. Yet, for a number of  reasons (of  which I bring up 
two ), I wonder if  Avant’s selective mobilization of  REPaNT does not hinder rather than 3
help our understanding of  the processes of  transnational governance and the creativity at 
work in them. 
First, Avant’s reading of  REPaNT emphasizes agreement, consensus and open minds while 
blocking out tensions, disagreement and contestation. Yet, enrolling and excluding actors/actants, 
shifting terms of  the debate/action, turning “facts into matters of  concern” and “making 
things public” are crucial parts of  the conceptual vocabularies of  REPaNT (e.g. Latour 
2004; Schouten 2014). Drawing on these vocabularies would be helpful for understanding 
the processes of  PMSI governance (Magnon-Pujo 2015). The MD grew out of  a 
contestation of  the existing governance, the MD shortcoming led to the development of  
ICoC that is currently developing a grievance mechanism and debating effective remedy in 
response to contestation. All along, critics have been proposing and developing alternative 
forms of  regulation, or distancing themselves from the process because they found the 
process flawed or difficult to engage (Joachim and Schneiker 2012). Second, and along 
similar lines, Avant does not mobilize the REPaNT theorization of  materiality. She does not 
work with anything resembling a “symmetrical ontology” in which both people and objects 
are part of  relations/networks and cause things to happen in them. Yet, this theorization of  
materiality is important for capturing PMSI governance processes. It directs the processes 
of  PMSI governance involving both a wide range of  actors and an equally wide range of  
objects such as regulations, codes or standards, databases, lists or surveillance technologies 
(e.g.  Abrahamsen and Williams 2009;  Leander and Aalberts 2013). Indeed from my 
perspective, these objects (I have developed the arguments with regards to lists) do 
important regulatory work that profoundly shapes governance processes (Leander 2016b). 
While Avant tells part of  the story about contestation and materiality, her mobilization of  
REPaNT makes her downplay its theoretical and conceptual significance. Instead she 
privileges “agreement” and “openness” focusing her energy on the agency of  states 
(especially the U.S.). In so doing, the account is not only shying away from the (theoretically 
and empirically) most challenging sides of  grappling with governance processes. It is 
perpetuating these challenges by reinforcing conventional approaches to the subject. My 
second question is therefore if  the selective mobilization of  theory, a REPaNT ‒ excluding 
 Again I am leaving out a host of  fundamental important issues pertaining to relationality, agency, affect and rationality for 3
reasons of  space.
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contestation/dissent and symmetric ontologies ‒  does not do more to obscure than to 
clarify how governance works. 
3)    The Relevance: Restricting Political Engagement? 
My last question concerns practical relevance. Avant concludes her article by marshalling the 
practical relevance of  “pragmatic thinking” as the ultimate proof  of  its advantages. Again I 
could not agree more with this point regarding the importance of  bridging the gap between 
academia and practice. However, for Avant the practical relevance of  pragmatism appears to 
be premised on participatory acquiescence with existing governance processes. Indeed, she 
contrasts the relevance of  her pragmatic approach with the irrelevance of  the “many [who] 
write off  governance efforts without ‘teeth’ as inconsequential; they push for 
uncompromising stances, hard decisions, and binding rules.” I wonder if  this is not a 
reductive understanding of  the ways in which academic knowledge matters for policy-
making. I will limit the discussion to three points commonly made in REPaNT contexts.  4
While intervention in policy-making processes may require a willingness to speak a language 
that does not aim at “reversing established sentiment” (Stengers 1995: 25), it is difficult to 
see why embracing and promoting the processes would be required or even useful. 
Academics (just as consultants in companies) are often invited precisely because they can 
pose the disturbing questions and point to more or less obvious flaws (such as the “lack of  
teeth” of  the MD or the absence of  effective remedy of  the ICoCA). The relevance of  the 
academic expert is therefore less to acquiesce than to question as an insider “agent 
provocateur” (Bueger 2017). But more fundamentally, intervention is perhaps not the only 
form of  relevance (Leander 2016a)? In REPaNT contexts at least two further forms of  
relevance that require some distance are often discussed. One is diffraction that is deviating 
the direction of  discussions/practices by introducing something novel and previously 
overlooked such as gender or race (Haraway 1997) of  relevance also to PMSI governance 
(Chisholm 2014; Eichler 2014). The other is disruption that is the setting of  a novel image of  
the issues at stake often through the creation of  a novel imaginary for example through art, 
humour or ridicule (Ranciere 2006) also of  relevance to security governance (Amoore and 
Hall 2012). 
Susan Strange argued that the price to pay for the privilege of  academic freedom was a 
willingness to raise unpopular questions (1989: 430). A very similar stance is taken by many 
REPaNT theorists as illustrated e.g. by Isabelle Stengers’ many political engagements 
(e.g. Stengers 1995, Pignarre and Stengers 2011, Stengers 2013a, Stengers 2013b, Stengers 
and Despret 2014). I wonder if  restricting relevance to acquiescent participation is not 
showing a lack of  imagination about what forms academic engagement with politics may 
take ‒ and hence also about what relevance means. 
 I leave out points about practices of  domination, discursive structures, and reflexivity that are usually not made by REPaNT 4
scholars. Patomäki’s contribution to this discussion delves on these in to some extent.
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POLITICS LOST? 
Kavi Abraham 
Johns Hopkins University 
How do we account for the emergence of  transnational governance of  private military and 
security companies (PMSCs)? According to Deborah Avant, recourse to conventional IR 
theory of  the realist or liberal variety is insufficient; instead, a “relational pragmatic” 
approach is better suited to grasp the complex dynamics that brought “effective 
governance” to PMSCs over the last decade. “Effective governance,” however, is not 
conventionally defined in terms of  steering – intentionally and efficiently directing a system 
or set of  practices toward some pre-determined value or end – since this conceptualization 
misses the dynamic and transactional quality of  how systems of  governance actually 
develop. Rather, “pragmatic accounts take effective governance to be creative collective 
action to solve a problem.” The value of  Avant’s theoretical framework, combining 
concepts of  network and pragmatist social theory, is clear: by employing an historically 
sensitive analysis, a relational pragmatic framework demonstrates how governance goals and 
solutions are not efficiently derived from pre-constituted interests but emerge and 
transform in the process of  interaction and deliberation. Avant’s approach, then, cashes out 
a key aspect of  pragmatist social theory by locating the creativity that emerges from 
collective problem-solving as actors ambiguously muddle through policy options in dynamic 
contexts and with shifting ends-in-view. 
Deploying categories of  creativity and innovation, interaction and shifting goals, 
representational and practical knowledge, Avant convincingly cobbles together an approach 
grounded in pragmatist thinking. But like other turns to philosophical pragmatism, I worry 
about the reduction, perhaps even the excision, of politics. In the focus on problem-solving, 
stakeholder consultations, and consensus, I wonder if  pragmatic approaches lose the forms 
of  domination, deep disagreement, conflict, and multiple exercises of  power that 
characterize processes of  global governance. Avant’s conditions for “effective governance,” 
for example, include agreement on the problem, broad inclusion of  relevant stakeholders, 
open discussion, and attention to usefulness or workability of  solutions; however, the very 
definition of  a problem, identification of  who counts as a stakeholder, or what constitutes 
usefulness imply prior political choices. In focusing on how interests shift in the process of  
collective problem-solving alone, a pragmatic approach misses part of  the story of  how 
governance emerges. 
As evidence, consider the choice of  the United States to participate in the Swiss-led forum 
(as opposed to previous UN-led efforts), which led to “effective governance” of  PMSCs. 
For Avant, the Swiss initiative succeeded in including the United States because it did not 
narrowly define the contours of  the problem from the start but only sought to “catalogue 
existing law.” Thus, in the absence of  any strong interest in transnational governance, U.S. 
officials could nevertheless agree to simply discuss the current state of  PMSC regulation. 
There were no substantive political stakes. 
However, from a governmentality perspective  (Larner and Walters 2004;  Merlingen 
2003; Rose 1993), the U.S. decision to engage with a multistakeholder forum while refusing 
coordination through the intergovernmental United Nations is evidence of  a deeply 
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political decision that speaks to (neo)liberal rationalities of  governing. For governmentality 
theorists, state power under contemporary (neo)liberalism is articulated in a specific way 
such that its exercise involves producing actors as active participants in their own regulation; 
objects of  governance — in this case, PMSCs — are made to act as subjects of  governance 
as well  (Sending and Neumann 2006, 658–61). Though UN-led processes may include 
consultations with PMSCs, they remain embedded within a fundamentally 
intergovernmental institutional framework. The nonstatist, consensus-oriented, voluntary, 
and self-regulative quality of  multistakeholder fora, on the other hand, orient global 
governance practices in a decidedly neoliberal way. From the standpoint of  a 
governmentality framework, the critical issue is not how U.S. priorities shifted to 
support any  transnational governance of  PMSCs but how it specifically came to support 
voluntary, self-regulation through multistakeholder deliberations rather than something else. 
Surely accounting for the emergence of  a regime for PMSCs in terms of  (neo)liberal 
governmentality does not displace a pragmatic interpretation, but it does, in my estimation, 
direct us to an important but overlooked dimension of  the story. 
The viability of  this interpretation is further evidenced by U.S. actions in other issue areas. 
Consider global regulation of  the internet: to date, US policy has consistently opposed 
centralizing governance in the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
choosing instead to support decentralized multistakeholder bodies. Though recognizing that 
multilateral (i.e. intergovernmental) organizations can play a role in certain “scenarios,” US 
officials maintain that they should not fundamentally be in the business of  internet 
governance (Zoller 2015). That the ITU is one of  the oldest international organizations, and 
a natural site for regulating a global communications infrastructure, only throw into relief  
that what matters for U.S. “interests” is not simply transnational governance or not but the 
form governance takes. 
The relationship between pragmatism and politics is an important one because often, in 
common and academic parlance, the former has come to signify a kind of  apolitical 
philosophy of  social action. Yet, many who developed and advanced the signposts of  
philosophical pragmatism did so through a deep and explicit commitment to participatory 
democracy, one that would upset the primary form of  domination in liberal 
polities  (Abraham and Abramson 2015). Dewey’s social theory, for instance, certainly 
highlighted the creativity that emerges from collective action, but this was politically 
important for Dewey inasmuch as it shored up a more robust notion of  democracy than 
the prevailing institutional one  (Dewey 1939). Of course, nothing dictates that the 
rearticulation of  pragmatism in contemporary IR must adhere to the democratic politics of  
earlier statements; however, if  pragmatic accounts are to be more than studies into policy 
formation, neither can they bracket prior political decisions or broader political contexts. 
Avant’s relational pragmatism makes great strides toward an explanation of  how 
transnational governance dynamically emerges, but without considering other relational 
accounts or examining the politics around which institutional sites are formed, the story 
remains incomplete. 
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PROCESSING LIBERAL STORIES OF 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Mark Laffey 
SOAS University of  London 
In her article, Deborah Avant  offers an account of  how “effective transnational 
governance” emerges in contemporary world politics. Focusing explicitly on process, she 
claims to have produced a new and significant framework for understanding the nature and 
development of  governance, which Avant conceives of  as itself  a process, not a fixed end-
state but rather an ongoing set of  practices and relations. That a focus on process offers 
something new is unsurprising: IR/IPE theory, at least in its dominant rationalist and 
constructivist forms, has generally been weak on process and its consequences, preferring to 
foreground the role of  structural factors such as state power, interest, and identity in 
determining outcomes. Process is rendered as a secondary, relatively unimportant factor, as 
simply the means through which structural factors work themselves out. 
Avant is explicit that what is at stake in her account are processes of  subject formation: her 
relational ontology “treats social beings as emergent phenomena, products, at any point in 
time, of  interactions.” Here too Avant points to a set of  important issues and questions. 
Rather than being seen as a series of  interactions between pre-given subjects, as in rationalist 
and constructivist analyses that take states (and other entities) for granted, Avant sets out to 
analyse the emergence of  the genuinely novel – perhaps even the unexpected – by showing 
how the very subjects of  world politics are themselves transformed in and through open-
ended processes of  transnational governance. Despite her narrow focus on PMSCs, this 
might in principle enable us to explore afresh the perennial problem of  identifying and 
explaining real change. In various ways, then, Avant’s analysis exhibits insight, ambition and 
promise. 
Yet, in my view this promise is not really fulfilled. I will focus on three areas at the heart of  
Avant’s argument: her understandings of  process, change, and novelty. The major source of  
these problems, I will argue, is Avant’s continuing commitment to what might be termed a 
sociologically weaponised version of  liberalism (cf. Jackson, 2012). That is, the basic 
subjects, objects and relations, as well as the understandings of  process structuring her 
analysis, are recognisably those of  liberalism. It is this commitment that accounts for the 
limited nature of  Avant’s relational ontology and her correspondingly thin findings in terms 
of  the emergence of  novelty and change. 
How does effective transnational governance emerge? According to Avant, the process is 
relatively simple: “successful collective action [is] most likely when people organize around 
solving a problem, engage openly, integrate relevant stakeholders, and attend to results.” 
More specifically, by making connections between relevant stakeholders and engaging in 
relatively open interactions, new ideas are generated. These in turn ‘resonate’ with or are 
‘attractive’ to stakeholders, who are thereby drawn further into the process. Also important 
is ‘workability’, the degree to which a particular set of  ideas is likely to produce an effective 
 9
response to the problem. As Avant expresses this point: “[agents] who can stimulate 
resonance with experience or ideas familiar to others, and who can promise workability, 
prove particularly important for generating collective action.” She develops these arguments 
in an analysis of  the emergence of  transnational governance of  PMSCs, in particular the 
Swiss-led production of  the Montreux Document. 
The categories through which Avant develops her account are straightforwardly liberal in 
character, as in her reference to ‘ideas’ which ‘attract’ or ‘resonate’ (cf. Laffey and Weldes 
1997). She does not provide an account of  the ways in which subjects are constituted and 
produced – as ‘private companies’ rather than as ‘mercenaries’, say – through the articulation 
of  linguistic and non-linguistic discursive practices. But perhaps the clearest expression of  
this commitment is the continuing reference to the public/private divide as manifested in 
the distinction between state and non-state actors, in particular the private companies that 
provide military and security services. Avant charts the emergence of  a legitimate 
international market in military and security provision, subject to regulation in the form of  
various kinds of  voluntary non-binding rules, domestic legislation and international 
standards, as well as self-policing activities on the part of  the private companies themselves. 
As is often characteristic of  liberal accounts of  the social, the role of  power is almost non-
existent in her analysis (cf. Barnett and Duvall 2005). Instead, the process through which 
new ideas and practices emerge looks a lot like communicative rationality and learning: 
states, companies and others, concerned about a problem, come together to discuss it in an 
open way and out of  this emerges ideas which, if  effective, are adopted, thus solving the 
problem. To the extent power enters into the discussion at all it is mostly in market terms: 
the U.S., for instance, is both a key producer and consumer of  the services PMSCs provide. 
The structural power of  business is not in evidence. In this context, it would have been 
useful to contrast Avant’s analysis with other accounts of  how regulation emerges and 
functions, both domestically and internationally, so as to highlight the central role business 
usually plays in generating regulation and the problematic character of  the public/private 
divide if  taken as a guide to the ordering and division of  social practices and relations (see, 
e.g., Kolko 1965; Chatterjee and Finger 1994; and Owens 2008, respectively). 
As such, despite Avant’s alternative social theoretical framework, we wind up with a very 
familiar picture of  the international as comprised of  states and other entities, now 
interacting within a shared framework of  transnational governance. In terms of  subject 
formation nothing very much has changed. If  anything Avant’s article ends by reassuring us 
that things are much the same, and getting better. States and others have new ideas about 
private military and security companies and have – consensually, co-operatively – set up 
standards and codes of  conduct. Given where she started, this must count as an 
opportunity missed.  
Ironically, Avant herself  opens up the question of  subject formation and change in a more 
substantive way, most clearly in her brief  discussion of  the U.S. state. As she says, a relational 
ontology means we should understand the U.S. as “a pattern of  connections, interactions, 
and reflections upon these in speech and writing. At any moment, social units like the 
United States are the congealed history that we remember. But they are continually creating, 
and created by, actors and their interactions.” Leaving aside the equation of  actors with 
individuals or groups, the over-emphasis on memory, which implies a greater degree of  self-
consciousness than I would want to endorse, and the absence of  any reference to violence – 
surely an integral feature of  any state –, this passage – an expression of  Avant’s 
commitment to a processual ontology – makes state subjectivity a dependent rather than an 
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independent variable. It is precisely through a heterogeneous set of  “connections, 
interactions, and reflections” that the ‘U.S.’ is produced, reproduced and transformed. 
This is an understanding of  subject formation potentially much richer than is found in, say, 
the constructivist analysis of  norms, which tends often to treat the state as a given unit to 
which various norms are applied. Opened up for investigation are the processes through 
which the production of  the state as subject takes place, and the relations of  power and 
hierarchy in and through which this occurs. Discourse analysis is fundamental to such an 
investigation, which is not reducible to the ideas of  state officials (Milliken 1999). In turn, as 
the state is produced as a subject so too are those relations of  power and hierarchy 
reproduced or transformed. The shifting character of  the public/private divide – treated as 
a shifting set of  linguistic and non-linguistic practices – is fundamental to the production of  
the state as a meaningful subject of  world politics, and to the division between ‘public’ and 
‘private’ power (cf. Wood 1995). 
In the substance of  her analysis, however, Avant fails to follow through on the possibilities 
such an ontology entails. The U.S. is repeatedly referred to as a consequential transnational 
actor - as an acting subject – even when it is also equated with the views of  a relatively small 
number of  state actors. Just how the one is related to the other is unclear: in what sense is 
the US state in the room when the discussions leading to the Montreux Document take 
place? How are the views of  several US officials transformed into the interests of  the US 
state? These equations are assumed rather than theorised. Further, in what sense are the 
subjects of  world politics transformed in this process? How do voluntary codes of  conduct 
produce or change PMSCs? On its face, the answer Avant gives must be, in both cases, not 
very much. Avant does not explore in any detail the changes in law and regulation she refers 
to nor how they relate to wider patterns of  international law, understood not simply as an 
instrument but as constitutive of  the global social (e.g., Gill and Cutler 2014; Pahuja 2011). 
Nor does she say anything about how such legal changes might be consequential for what 
the state IS. Instead, we are left with a standard liberal Weberian analysis, which focuses on 
the ideas of  state actors and the state as a set of  institutions separate and distinct from the 
social relations in which it is embedded. 
An alternative, and more substantial analysis , one consistent with the possibilities inherent 
in Avant’s relational ontology, might begin with a return to the wider literature on the 
privatization of  security. Uncertainty about the public/private divide – a structural principle 
constitutive of  the state – is a central issue within that scholarship. In common with much 
IR/IPE analysis of  world politics Avant’s framing of  the emergence of  effective 
transnational governance begins with the strong assumption that public and private are 
meaningful categories that distinguish between different kinds of  actors and spaces, most 
obviously states on the one hand and PMSCs on the other. Her entire analysis takes for 
granted that these are separate entities which interact but which through that interaction do 
not fundamentally change: the public/private divide is reproduced, even as firms produce 
voluntary codes of  conduct and states adopt non-binding forms of  legal regulation. Indeed, 
for her, effective transnational governance is nothing but the production of  these codes and 
regulations. 
Yet a distinctive feature of  the rise of  PMSCs has been a blurring of  the public/private 
divide, raising serious questions for analyses that assume rather than interrogate the 
distinction (see, e.g., Abrahamsen and Williams 2010). The heavy reliance by the U.S. and 
U.K. states on the private provision of  security documented by  Elke Krahmann 
(2010) might be taken to suggest that we are seeing a structural change in what the state is – 
precisely because, in Weberian terms, the state has previously been defined in terms of  its 
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monopoly over the legitimate use of  force, and also because the relations between (public) 
state and (private) security provider are increasingly internal rather than external. If  the state 
can no longer function effectively without private security providers then it is no longer the 
state IR/IPE thought it knew. Bringing the private provision of  force and security into 
established international law – the normalization of  force as a commodity, in other words – 
is then perhaps not best understood as effective transnational governance but rather as both 
the logical continuation of  ongoing processes of  neoliberalization (Brenner et al 2010),and 
also more fundamentally the structural transformation and internationalization of  the state 
(Murray 1971; Laffey, Nadarajah and Kanopathipillai 2015). Such an argument, were it to be 
borne out by empirical analysis, would require taking more seriously than does Avant the 
connections, interactions and reflections through which the U.S. (and others) is produced as 
a subject of  world politics, and their effects.   
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A PRAGMATIC RESPONSE 
Deborah Avant 
University of  Denver 
Let me begin by thanking my four colleagues for their thoughtful engagement with my 
article. While it is ironic that the more mainstream analyses my argument aimed at are not 
represented here, I appreciate the insights of  this more critical crowd versed in either the 
relational theory behind my argument, the private security phenomena, or both. As I read 
their responses, I was struck by the degree to which they are similarly anchored by critiques 
based on what they saw as the 1) absence of  structural logic, 2) absence of  power or 
politics, and 3) overly optimistic assessment. Rather than responding to each particular 
response, then, I will organize my thoughts around these three threads. 
First, these authors share a frustration that my analysis misses the “real 
problem” (Leander), “prior political choices” (Abraham), what created the congealed 
history that constitutes actors (Laffey), the wider social (neoliberal) context (Patomäki). 
This critiques point to the roots of  the private security phenomena as if  there were some 
material or structural logic at work that would then condition effective governance. Even a 
bumper sticker version of  pragmatism, though, would point us toward focusing on the 
fruits rather than the roots of  action. My aim in this article was not to explain why the 
private security phenomena emerged or make any claim about its structural logic. Instead, I 
wanted to know how what seemed like a politics stuck in disagreement – perhaps due to its 
roots – became more fluid and developed some areas of  agreement. The puzzle, in effect, is 
how those involved appear to have broken free of  their structural roots. My claim is that the 
process of  focusing on a problem (not the same as agreeing on what it is), generating new 
connections, remaining open to new information, and attending to workability were critical 
to this shift. Each of  these authors seem to want me to point out how the structures in 
place limited the possibilities. I think that is inescapably true, but my rejection of  their 
assumption that an essential logic is attached to any given structure makes it also beside the 
point. 
Second, several fault my analysis with ignoring power (Laffey) or politics 
(Leander and Abraham). But their view of  power and politics is quite narrow. Power need 
not be firmly attached to a particular actor nor lorded over another to have effect. The 
process itself  generated power to create collective action that was not seen as possible 
before. My point was to examine a more generative view of  power – similar to productive 
power in Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) scheme, but better captured by the notion of  “power 
to” rather than “power over” (Berenskoetter 2007:3). As Berenskoetter describes, Weber 
discussed the power to accomplish one’s will “not only against but also with others”. Arendt 
took this idea much further arguing that power was not shot out of  the barrel of  a gun but 
was creative and productive and entailed coming together to generate new collective action 
(Berenskoetter 2007: 3-4). Surely understanding how a diverse group of  government, 
business and civil society representatives turned to an international code of  conduct for 
private security providers, how representatives of  the United States came to support this 
process even though they had refused to even consider such a thing earlier, and how U.S. 
support lent capacity to the process that drew others along is a process of  both power and 
politics. This development will undoubtedly have distributional effects but those involved in 
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the process also saw the development as a step toward solving a problem. Furthermore, a 
pragmatic take on power would expect the distributional consequences to be less obviously 
predicted by their roots (neoliberal or other) than these more structurally oriented scholars 
expect. So I do not ignore power and politics so much as I take issue with a narrow, zero 
sum, conception of  either. 
A third and related thread is a skepticism about the “optimistic” tone of  this article. Where 
is the critique? The discouragement? The resistance?  The disruption?  Can an analysis really 
be serious if  it is not pessimistic?  I am of  two minds on this. On the one hand, I think I am 
actually less abstractly optimistic than are some of  these authors. I don’t think there are 
“true” solutions to problems. Humans are complex and flawed creatures who face enduring 
social challenges. So what I mean by effective governance is not achieving “true” solutions 
to “real” problems but working together – even in contentious and incomplete ways – to 
respond collectively in ways that seem to work. That may be the best we can do. On the 
other hand, though, I think we should take care not to dismiss the benefits of  this 
contentious and incomplete coming together around collective purpose. The consequences 
of  unforgiving commitment to what is “best” often leaves societies much worse off.  
Knowing where to draw the line between pushing harder for a superior solution and 
accepting one that seems to work toward something better is our enduring challenge. How 
people judge where the balance lies is often the product of  a mix of  intuition and logic, and 
it requires a willingness to reject complete skepticism (Knight and Johnson 2011: 26-7). But 
accepting the fallibility of  humans also means that governance is often “thin”. While 
Abraham is correct to note that Dewey (and others) hoped for great transformations, when 
true to their ideas they did not expect these to emerge at all at once in an internally 
consistent way.  It may be that only in the rear view mirror does an old style of  governance 
look thick. While I appreciate – and largely agree with – Anna Leander’s description of  the 
various ways academics can weigh in to policy debates (and celebrate all these efforts), I 
would not call my analysis “acquiescent” and would argue that we should also preserve a 
role for academics to analyze how those who were opposed found common ground, even 
if  it is only partial and incomplete.     
Finally, Mark Laffey makes a fair point that I open the door for examining the process by 
which the various participants take the subject form they do but do not fully explore that 
process. I take the participants involved at face value according to their authority claims 
rather than exploring their constitution via history, performance, or something else. How 
and why particular individuals come to represent the United States (or other entities, for that 
matter) is an important question worth of  more attention. Similarly, whether the Montreux/
ICoCA process reconstitutes PMSCs and their governing subjects is also significant. I am 
not sure Laffey’s critique is entirely fair, though, as I do detail in the article the development 
of  standards based on these agreements and changes in U.S. regulations requiring 
compliance with them. These should both count as “changes in law and regulation.” 
Significant reconstitution is more likely if  this process joins with others that already 
resonate, like the UN’s Global Compact and Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights, as well as others like the Voluntary Principles on Business and Human Rights. I do 
not see these other agreements as decisive and constraining of  creativity, as  Patomäki 
claims, but enabling. Joining with these other agreement can both legitimize the ICoCA and 
reinforce the others, depending on their perceived usefulness. Though I can point to some 
changes in how PMSCs refer to themselves and the language of  their clients and regulators, 
we are still too early in this process to say much about the reconstitution of  subjects. 
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As more of  these creative agreements multiply across many issue areas I endorse Laffey’s 
plea for more and better analysis. Indeed, I (and others) have called for a stronger research 
agenda examining how these unconventional forms (of  cooperation and conflict) are 
shaping the emerging structures – and processes – of  global politics (Avant, Finnemore and 
Sell 2010; Avant and Westerwinter 2016; Goddard and Nexon 2016). I also agree that these 
new arrangements are affecting how we think about public, private, and the line between the 
two – though these categories and lines have also shifted considerably in the past (Avant and 
Haufler 2014). How the process I describe, and others like it, will affect wider patterns of  
social order is of  critical importance but if  I were to wager on how to best understand these 
changes, I would bet on more attention to processes rather than the inherent logic of  
structures, a broad rather than narrow view of  power and politics, and a critical but not 
entirely skeptical orientation toward the prospect that collective action can address global 
problems. 
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